We investigate whether collateral helps to solve adverse selection problems. Theory predicts a negative relationship between presence of collateral and risk premium, as collateral constitutes a signalling instrument for the borrower to be charged with a lower risk premium. However, bankers' view and most empirical evidence contradict this prediction in accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis. We provide new evidence with loan-level data and country-level data for a sample of 5843 bank loans from 43 countries. We test whether the degree information asymmetries affects the link between the presence of collateral and risk premium. We include five proxies for the degree of information asymmetries, measuring opacity of financial information, trust, and development. We find that a greater degree of information asymmetries reduces the positive relationship between the presence of collateral and the risk premium. This finding provides support for the adverse selection and observed-risk hypotheses, as both hypotheses may be empirically validated depending of the degree of information asymmetries in the country.
Introduction
There is widespread evidence regarding the massive use of collateral by banks for firm loans. Berger and Udell (1995) observe that 53% of firm loans are secured in the USA, whereas Davydenko and Franks (2005) observe that 75.7% of firm loans are secured in France and 88.5% in Germany.
It is therefore of utmost interest to know why banks use collateral. A first intuitive reason is that collateral provides a reduction in the risk of loan loss for the bank in the event of default. It can also be argued however that collateral helps solve problems resulting from information asymmetries, and notably the problem of moral hazard after the loan is granted. By giving collateral, the interests of the borrower are forcibly aligned with those of the bank. Furthermore, collateral, which in turn helps minimize adverse selection, constitutes a signalling instrument by providing the bank with valuable information at the time of lending. Indeed, collateral helps the bank obtain private information owned by the borrower, as high-quality borrowers are more likely to provide collateral in compensation for a low loan rate than low-quality borrowers.
Extensive publications provide theoretical support for this latter argument (Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987) , which is quite easily testable. Indeed, the signalling role of collateral and its ability to mitigate adverse selection problems should lead to lower rates for secured loans.
However, two surprising observations emerge from the empirical literature. The first one is the small number of studies on this topic, which are all single-country studies, and all investigate this issue in developed countries Udell, 1990, 1995 The second and most striking observation is the consensual lack of empirical support for the adverse selection hypothesis in the use of collateral. Indeed most papers conclude to a positive relationship between collateral and risk premium, with such finding in accordance with the commonly accepted view among bankers that riskier loans would be associated with more collateral, as mentioned by Berger and Udell (1990) and Jimenez and Saurina (2004) . The rationale is that banks would be able to sort the borrowers from information they have on their quality. As a result, they would charge riskier borrowers with higher loan rates and require higher collateral from these borrowers. This argument is commonly called the observed-risk hypothesis.
The aim of this paper is therefore to provide a broad and ambitious investigation of the role of collateral to mitigate adverse selection problems. Our starting point is the consideration that the conflicting debate between the adverse selection hypothesis and the observed-risk hypothesis is flawed. Indeed, both hypotheses may be empirically validated depending of the degree of information asymmetries. Namely, they differ regarding the importance of the information asymmetries between the borrower and the bank. In presence of strong information asymmetries, the incentives for the borrower would be stronger to signal his quality to the bank, while in case of low information asymmetries the bank is more likely to know the quality of the borrower and therefore to charge the borrower with a greater loan rate and a higher probability to require collateral from him.
Therefore, both hypotheses may be validated depending on the degree of information asymmetries in a country.
To this end, we perform a cross-country investigation of the relationship between collateral and risk premium to allow the consideration of different national frameworks.
We do so by using the dataset Dealscan which provides detailed information on loan characteristics for a large set of countries. It enables a major contribution to the role of collateral to mitigate adverse selection problems by investigating the possible impact of country-specific variables influencing information asymmetries on this role. We use five proxies to capture the degree of information asymmetries between the borrower and the bank before the loan is granted. They control for opacity of financial information, trust, economic and financial development. Namely, the adverse selection hypothesis would be rejected whether a positive link between collateral and risk premium is observed. However it also receives some support in parallel with the observed-risk hypothesis if we conclude that factors reducing information asymmetries contribute to strengthen the positive link between collateral and risk premium. Such finding would indeed mean that the relationship between collateral and risk premium is dependent of the degree of information asymmetries between the borrower and the bank, in accordance with both hypotheses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the framework of the role of collateral to solve adverse selection problems. We first develop the background on this role, before describing the country-level variables adopted to control for this relationship in our investigation. Section III describes the data and loan-level variables. In section IV, we report the results. We finally provide some concluding remarks in section V, and the Appendix contains explanations of all variables we use in the paper.
II. Collateral and adverse selection: a conceptual framework

II.1 Theoretical and empirical background
This section presents the literature on the adverse selection argument for the use of collateral. Before presenting the empirical tests, it is necessary to develop the theory underlying the argument.
Collateral may solve the problem of adverse selection thanks to the better information owned by the borrower in comparison to the bank before the lending decision. This private information may lead to credit rationing because of the inability of the bank to price the loan according to the borrower's quality (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) .
Therefore, high-quality borrowers have incentives to show their quality, using a credible signal, one that can not be provided by low-quality borrowers. Collateral is such a signal, as it is more costly for low-quality borrowers since they have a higher chance of defaulting and hence of losing the collateral (Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987) . Consequently, as collateral acts as a signalling device, it conveys valuable information about the borrower to the bank, which can then screen borrowers by offering the choice between a secured loan with a low interest rate and an unsecured loan with a high interest rate. A high-quality borrower will be inclined to choose the secured loan since his low risk of default diminishes the probability of losing collateral and increases the probability of repaying interest.
This argument supports a negative link between collateral and credit risk, as a secured loan would be associated with a higher quality of borrowers. However, the fact that collateral is associated with greater credit risk has gone mainstream among bankers as mentioned by Berger and Udell (1990) and Jimenez and Saurina (2004) . The rationale underlying the observed-risk hypothesis is that, with information on the quality of potential borrowers, banks are able to charge riskier borrowers with higher rates, simultaneously requiring more collateral from these borrowers to reduce loan loss in the event of default. Since collateral reduces potential loss, the bank would be more inclined ceteris paribus to demand collateral from high-risk clients.
The coexistence of this hypothesis and the adverse selection argument makes the link between collateral and risk premium of utmost interest. Therefore, we tackle the question of knowing whether the selection adverse argument is empirically validated for the use of collateral.
Empirical literature remains however relatively scarce on this issue. Berger and Udell (1990) investigate the relationship between collateral and credit risk on a sample of one million loans from US banks. They test the hypothesis that adverse selection matters for the use of collateral by regressing the risk premium on a set of loan characteristics including a dummy variable considering whether the loan is secured or not. The conclusion does not corroborate the adverse selection argument, as a positive and significant relationship is observed between collateral and risk premium. This finding may be explained by the fact that banks require more collateral from riskier borrowers who are also charged with higher loan rates, in accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis.
However, in a work focusing on the associations between collateral, banking relationship and risk premium, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find a negative link between the presence of collateral and interest rate for a sample of 18 000 Belgian loans.
It is important to note, however, that this result, in accordance with the adverse selection hypothesis, may be influenced by the specificities of the dataset. This study is the only one on this topic, using loans from only one bank, as all loans come from a major Belgian bank. Therefore the behavior of the bank in loan collateralization affects the results and limits their generalization. Jimenez and Saurina (2004) focus on the determinants of the probability of default of bank loans analyzing 3 million loans provided by Spanish banks. Probability of default is considered as an ex post credit risk measure. As a consequence, they do not only test whether collateral mitigates adverse selection problems, but also whether collateral solves moral hazard problems. The probability of default is explained by a set of loan characteristics including information on collateral. Depending on the collateralized share of the loan, the model takes into account three dummy variables. The authors find a greater probability of default for secured loans, which is in accordance with the view of a positive link between the presence of collateral and credit risk.
Finally, the most recent study from Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006) takes a broader perspective by analyzing a wide range of determinants of the presence of collateral. This study does not however analyze the link between the presence of collateral and risk premium. Tested determinants include the characteristics of the borrower with credit quality, but also the characteristics of the bank, the competition on the loan market and the macroeconomic conditions. Credit quality, related to the theories on a bank's use of collateral, is proxied by a dummy variable which takes into account the fact that the borrower had recently a loan in default. The authors then observe that the credit quality of the borrower positively affects the presence of collateral, which is in accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis.
This presentation of the literature devoted to the adverse selection argument for the use of collateral leads to two main conclusions. First, empirical evidence tends to support the observed-risk hypothesis, according to which riskier borrowers are more often required to provide collateral. This hypothesis is commonly accepted by bankers. At first glance, this element tends to invalidate the theoretical argument of the use of collateral to resolve adverse selection problems. Second, the few studies that exist remain limited to few developed countries. Therefore, no study testing this role of collateral has ever been performed in developing countries. Consequently, their results may be influenced by hidden variables such as institutions and development. Our empirical work aims to address these deficiencies.
II.2 Country-level explanatory variables
Our work investigates the role that collateral plays in mitigating adverse selection.
To this end, we test the relationship between collateral and risk premium with a set of 43 countries. Next to the general relationship observed between these both variables, one may wonder whether some country-specific variables exert an impact on this link. Indeed, the theoretical argument supporting the role of collateral to mitigate ex ante information asymmetries is based on its signalling role. The opposite hypothesis, the observed-risk hypothesis, considers that, before the loan is granted, information asymmetries are overestimated and that banks can sort the borrowers from information they have on their credit quality.
As a consequence, we can consider that country-specific factors exert an impact on information asymmetries, affecting the relationship between collateral and risk premium. . However, as our focus is on the skills of bank employees in risk analysis of loans, the adopted measure of financial development for our study needs to proxy the importance of bank credit in a country. Therefore, we define Financial Development as the ratio of the volume of credit to private enterprises to GDP averaged over the 1995 to 1997 period. That ratio measures the extent to which credit is allocated to private firms, as opposed to government or state-owned firms. It is widely used in the empirical literature to proxy for the development of financial intermediaries (e.g. Beck and Levine, 2004 ). We expect a positive impact of these variables on the relationship between presence of collateral and risk premium, as they are both associated with lower information asymmetries.
We also include some control variables in our analysis. A third control variable takes bank costs into account. Indeed risk premium is expected to cover operating costs of banks. Therefore, bank costs should be positively associated with risk premium. Bank Costs is defined as the ratio of overhead costs to total banking assets for 1999, following Barth, Caprio and . This information is derived from the same article.
III. Data and variables
The sample of bank loans is obtained from the Dealscan database, which is supplied by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters), which provides detailed information on loans to large companies. As the focus of our research is the investigation of country-level factors on the use of collateral to solve adverse selection problems, we only keep loans from countries for which we have country-level information for most of the required factors. We use loan data for the period January 1991 to August 2006. The focus of our research is the investigation of the relationship between risk premium and the presence of collateral. To this end, we proceed to regressions of risk premium on a set of variables including the presence of collateral and some loan-level control variables. Risk premium is the difference between the loan rate and the prime rate used by the bank for the loan pricing. Information on risk premium is directly provided in the database.
We estimate the following equation using OLS regression:
The explanatory variable of primary concern is the presence of collateral, which, in accordance with most works on the use of collateral, is measured by a dummy variable (Collateral) equal to one if the loan is secured and to zero if it is not. We also investigate how the degree of information asymmetries influences the relationship between risk premium and the presence of collateral. To account for these variables, we add Collateral× Key Variable, which is an interaction term between each country-level variable measuring this degree and the presence of collateral in the regressions.
X is a vector of control variables. These include information on loan maturity (Maturity), on the type of loan, which is controlled through a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is a term loan and otherwise to zero 1 (Type). As many loans are syndicated, we control for the number of lenders involved in the loan by measuring the logarithm of the number of lenders, following notably Qian and Strahan (2007) (Number of Lenders). We also take into account information on loan size (LoanAmount), which is defined as the amount of the tranche of the loan in thousand dollars. Indeed syndicated loans are granted by tranches, which can be charged with different loan rates. Finally, the presence of covenants in the loan contracts is controlled through a dummy variable equal to one if the loan contract includes covenants and otherwise to zero (Covenants). Dummy variables for each industry (for each 1-digit SIC code) and each year are also included in the estimations to control for industry effects and year effects. ε is the residual which is supposed to be normally distributed. Table 1 reports mean values for the loan-level variables by country. Risk premium varies considerably, from 71.67 basic points in Ghana to 320 in South Africa, with a mean value of 166.06 basic points for the full sample. These differences partly reflect the differences in economic development which contribute to reduce the risk premium, even if significant exceptions exist. The proportion of secured loans strongly varies across countries from 10.99% in Japan to 100% in five countries (Ghana, Guatemala, Morocco, Peru, and Uruguay). On the full sample, 55.72% of loans are secured.
Regarding the maturity of loans, the cross-country discrepancies are rather limited with mean maturities ranging from 12 months in Morocco to 137 months in Portugal. As many loans are syndicated, the number of lenders ranges from 1 in Uruguay to 20 in Ghana, with a mean of 7.98 lenders for the full sample. 
IV. Results
This section displays the results of our study on the role of collateral to solve adverse selection problems. In our regression models, we begin by testing the link between risk premium and the presence of collateral in cross-country estimations. These estimations provide some benchmark regressions for the rest of the study. We then investigate how the degree of information asymmetries influences the relationship between risk premium and the presence of collateral. To this end, we add an interaction term between each country-level variable measuring this degree and the presence of collateral in the regressions.
Next we perform two kinds of robustness check tests. First, we test whether our findings are sensitive to the inclusion of other country-level variables, and second, we investigate the issue of the endogeneity of collateral in our estimations.
IV.1 The benchmark estimations
We first present the results of the regression of risk premium for the different sets of variables. These estimations are benchmarks for the ones including the interaction terms, as they provide valuable information on the coefficient of Collateral and on the coefficients of the control variables, which are likely to be affected by the inclusion of the interaction terms. The results are displayed in This subsection has shown that collateral is positively associated with risk premium in our cross-country sample. Supporting the observed-risk hypothesis, this is a major result, as it is the first study that uses a cross-country sample. The heterogeneity of our country sample presents a major advantage which must be exploited for a thorough investigation of the role of collateral to solve adverse selection. Indeed, the positive link between collateral and risk premium may be dependent on the degree of information asymmetries between the borrower and the bank before the loan is granted. Therefore, the adverse selection hypothesis can also receive some support if we observe that greater information asymmetries reduce the positive link between collateral and risk premium. In this aim, we perform estimations controlling for the influence of the degree of information asymmetries.
IV.2 The estimations with an interaction term
We now turn to estimations including an interaction term between Collateral and one country-specific variable which might influence the degree of ex ante information asymmetries between the borrower and the bank. Sharing. These findings therefore support the view that a lower degree of information asymmetries increases the positive relationship between collateral and risk premium, and consequently enhances the likelihood of the observed-risk hypothesis. They may also be in accordance with the adverse selection hypothesis, as a low degree of one of these variables could be small enough to favor a negative relationship between collateral and risk premium.
Therefore, we check whether the relationship might be negative in some countries.
To this end, we compute the overall coefficient of Collateral for all estimations, which is the sum of the coefficients of The second estimations concern Trust, and are displayed in Table 3 . Our results
show again a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term. As Trust proxies honesty of the borrower and trust of the bank towards the borrower, this finding is again in favor of the view that a lower degree of information asymmetries contributes to strengthen the positive relationship between collateral and risk premium. With Trust, the overall coefficient of Collateral is always positive as both coefficients for Collateral and for the interaction term are positive. Therefore, the degree of Trust can not lead to some countries in which collateral would affect negatively risk premium.
Finally, the third set of estimations is devoted to the role of economic and financial development and is presented in table 5. As mentioned above, the argument is that bank employees would benefit from better skills in analysis of risk default for loans in a country with a greater level of economic and financial development. Therefore, they would face a lower degree of ex ante information asymmetries. Once again, we observe positive and significant coefficients for the interaction term in the regressions. As greater economic and financial development is associated with lower information asymmetries, these findings support the views that lower information asymmetries increase the positive link between collateral and risk premium.
We can again wonder whether there exist some countries characterized by information asymmetries strong enough to lead to a negative link between presence of collateral and risk premium. With Economic Development, the threshold is 7.149.
However the minimum value for this variable is 7.149. As a result, no country has an overall coefficient of Collateral which is negative. With Financial Development, the threshold is 0.295. Thirteen countries have a value below this threshold (Argentina, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Slovenia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela), which mean that the overall coefficient of collateral is negative for these countries.
In summary, the findings clearly support the hypothesis that the degree of information asymmetries exerts an influence on the relationship between collateral and risk premium. We therefore provide some support for the observed-risk hypothesis and the adverse selection hypothesis, as both hypotheses may be empirically validated depending on the degree of information asymmetries in the country. In accordance with this remark, we observe that the relationship between presence of collateral and risk premium, which was positive in benchmark regressions, can be negative in countries with strong information asymmetries. Such finding is only observed for developing countries, which may explain why this result contradicts former evidence on this topic. It also constitutes a major motivation ex post for this seminal investigation on a sample of countries, including some developing countries.
IV.3 Robustness tests
Our robustness checks include two sets of tests. The first one investigates the inclusion of alternative country-level variables. The second one analyzes the issue of endogeneity of collateral in our estimations. In all robustness tests, we display results from model specifications with the full conditioning information set.
We first test the inclusion of alternative country-level variables. We start by adding "fundamental variables" in the estimations. Namely, such variables affect institutional variables which were adopted in our estimations. We test the presence of two sets of fundamental characteristics. We add variables for legal origin, as this dimension has been shown to influence financial development (La Porta et al., 1997a This first set of tests leads to the conclusion that our findings are robust to the choice of country-level variables, as alternative specifications do not alter our results.
We now turn to the issues of endogeneity in our estimations. In order to tackle these issues, we re-estimate the model specifications using a simultaneous equations framework 4 . Under the hypothesis of sequentiality in the collateral and risk premium decision, we assume a unidirectional relationship between We use the three stages least squares (3SLS) method to estimate the two equations model in order to exploit the correlation of the disturbances across the equations 6 . The estimation of the system is complicated by the presence of both continuous (Risk The results of stepwise discriminant analysis and probit regression confirm this selection.
Results from the probit regression of Collateral are displayed in table 7. The statistics of the regression are satisfactory, with a significant likelihood ratio and a satisfactory percentage of concordance (above 75%). All of the coefficients have expected significant signs.
We display the results from model specifications with the full conditioning information set in tables 8 and 9. Table 8 This is a major finding, as it suggests that, when endogeneity is controlled, a negative link emerges between collateral and risk premium. However, our key issue is not the sign of this relationship for the full sample, but whether the degree of ex ante information asymmetries influences this link. This is a more relevant issue to understand the use of collateral by banks, since it tends to demonstrate that adverse selection and observed-risk hypotheses may not be antagonistic, and can both be empirically validated depending of the degree of the country.
To this end, we perform estimations with interaction terms between Collateral and the country-specific variables proxying the degree of ex ante information asymmetries for the regressions from tables 3, 4, 5, 6. We are able to test whether the observed signs of the interaction terms remain unchanged when endogeneity is controlled. These estimations are reported in Consequently, we conclude that the tests controlling for endogeneity do not hamper our key finding regarding the role of information asymmetries on the relationship between collateral and risk premium. Indeed, we still observe that lower information asymmetries increase the overall coefficient of Collateral to explain Risk Premium.
Therefore, these robustness tests strengthen our main conclusion that both observed-risk and adverse selection hypotheses may be empirically validated depending of the degree of information asymmetries in the country.
V. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analyze the role of collateral to mitigate adverse selection problems on a large set of loans from 43 countries. According to the adverse selection hypothesis, we should observe a negative relationship between the presence of collateral and risk premium, as collateral constitutes a signalling instrument for high-quality borrowers. The observed-risk hypothesis is however in favor of a positive link between these both variables, owing to the ability of the bank to sort borrowers according to their quality.
At first glance, these hypotheses are contradictory, even though they are both based on the degree of information asymmetries before the loan granting. Indeed, the adverse selection hypothesis assumes the existence of strong information asymmetries resulting in the need for the borrower to use quality signals, while observed-risk hypothesis considers low information asymmetries leading to the ability of the bank to observe borrower risk.
As a consequence, both hypotheses may be empirically validated depending on the degree of information asymmetries.
We find that a lower degree of information asymmetries, proxied through five country-level variables, enhances the positive relationship between the presence of collateral and risk premium. We therefore provide some support for the adverse selection and observed-risk hypotheses, as both hypotheses may be empirically validated depending on the degree of information asymmetries in the country. In addition, this result is robust to tests controlling for the potential endogeneity of collateral.
Our findings strongly qualify the view that the role of collateral to mitigate adverse selection problems should be rejected, in sharp contrast to the existing empirical literature. They are in line with the theoretical arguments provided notably by Bester (1985), Chan and Kanatas (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987) .
The normative implications of our findings are the support of the efforts to reduce information asymmetries before the loan granting. Indeed, collateral requirements have been widely mentioned to constitute major obstacles to the access to credit. Therefore, as lower information asymmetries reduce such requirements, they favor access to credit and consequently promote investment. Authorities can contribute to reduce information asymmetries through better quality of financial information and the implementation of information-sharing institutions. (2) . Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variables in the equations system are Risk Premium and Collateral. Results for the Risk Premium estimation are provided. Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and years are included in the regressions but are not reported.
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